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Abstract 
Economic sociologists have studied how social relationships shape market prices by focusing 
mostly on vertical interactions between buyers and sellers. In this paper, we examine instead the 
price consequences of horizontal relationships that arise from intergroup processes among 
sellers. Our setting is the market for Champagne grapes. Using proprietary transaction-level data, 
we find that female grape growers—a minority in the growers’ community—charge 
systematically higher prices than do male grape growers. We argue that the underlying 
mechanism for this unexpected pattern of results involves the relationships developed and 
maintained by minority members. More specifically, in-depth fieldwork reveals that female 
growers get together to compensate for their isolation from the majority. This behavior enables 
them to overcome local constraints on the availability of price-relevant information, constraints 
that stem from prevailing norms of market behavior: individualism and secrecy. We discuss the 
implications of these findings for the study of how relationships shape price-setting processes, 
for the sociological literature on intergroup relations, and for our understanding of inequality in 
markets. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A widely accepted tenet of economic sociology is that market behavior is both embedded in and 
shaped by networks of social relationships (Granovetter 1985; Smelser and Swedberg 2005). 
One of the most vital aspects of market behavior is price setting; it determines how actors are 
valued, how resources are allocated, and who appropriates the rents from those resources (Uzzi 
and Lancaster 2004). Hence the various ways in which social relations affect pricing have 
received considerable scholarly attention (Baker 1984; Podolny 1993; Uzzi 1999; Uzzi and 
Lancaster 2004). Generally speaking, relationships shape prices either by signaling, to buyers, 
the quality of sellers (Podolny 1993; Benjamin and Podolny 1999) or by contributing to the 
governance of interactions between sellers and buyers—as when the exchange of private 
information helps to improve service or to reduce costs (Uzzi and Lancaster 2004; Bidwell and 
Fernandez-Mateo 2010). 
Most of this research focuses on vertical relationships between buyers and sellers. The 
sociological literature has paid less attention to the role of horizontal social ties—that is, among 
sellers or among buyers—in price-setting processes. Yet we know that meaningful horizontal 
relationships are common and may shape market behavior via mechanisms that differ from those 
at play in vertical buyer–seller relationships. Notably, Ingram and Roberts (2000) study 
friendships among competitors and show that they improve organizational performance by 
enhancing collaboration and mitigating harmful competition. Their research highlights that 
competition is often imbued with “extra-economic” interactions that shape collective norms of 
behavior and regulate market dynamics (see also Zelizer 1988). Building on the view that 
horizontal relations between sellers can yield legitimate benefits (Ingram and Roberts 2000), we 
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describe a different and previously unexamined social mechanism whereby such relationships 
can affect price-setting: intergroup processes. 
Many markets are characterized by constraints on the availability of information 
(Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976; Phlips 1988); for instance, local norms of behavior may create 
frictions in terms of information sharing (Fauchard and Von Hippel 2008). We draw from the 
literature on intergroup relations (Wirth 1945; Blalock 1967; Brewer 1991; Olzak 1992; 
Okamoto 2003; Gullickson 2010) to propose that horizontal relationships can help minority 
sellers overcome some of these frictions. Our starting point is that not all sellers are equally 
likely to form relationships with one another (Ingram and Roberts 2000). Thus intergroup 
processes may affect the likelihood of sellers getting together; in particular, we expect that 
members of a minority are especially likely to develop such horizontal relationships. A wealth of 
sociological research has established that being isolated from the majority can trigger “reactive 
solidarity” among minority members (Simmel 1908/1955; Coser 1956/1984; Bonacich and 
Modell 1980; Olzak and West 1991). Social psychologists have also demonstrated that, when 
individuals feel excluded from the larger social collective, they often satisfy their need for 
inclusion by identifying more strongly with their minority group (Brewer 1991). In the context of 
horizontal market relationships, these processes translate into minority sellers coming together 
for social support and developing stronger relationships with each other than are evidenced 
among majority sellers. We expect these horizontal relations to help minority group members 
overcome local constraints on the availability of information and hence to affect important 
market outcomes, such as the prices they obtain. 
Demonstrating the operation of this mechanism poses a substantial empirical challenge. 
Most importantly, it requires a setting in which buyer-side discrimination is “switched off” so 
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that we can isolate the price consequences of intergroup relations among sellers. This task is 
crucial for our study in light of the empirical evidence documenting that sellers’ minority status 
in vertical relationships (i.e., between buyers and sellers) results in prices that are less 
advantageous to the seller. Indeed, buyers have been shown to pay lower prices to minority 
sellers in a variety of markets (Nardinelli and Simon 1990; List 2004; Ayres, Banaji, and Jolls 
2011; Doleac and Stein 2013). So unless we can minimize the possibility of buyer-side 
discrimination, any observed price differences between minority and majority sellers will be 
difficult to attribute to relationships on the seller’s side of the market. This strict requirement is 
met by our research setting: the market for Champagne grapes, in which growers (i.e., farmers) 
sell grapes directly to their buyers (Champagne houses). As we shall describe in some detail, this 
market has two characteristics that we can use for identification purposes: (i) quality is fully 
observed, and (ii) buyers are relatively price inelastic owing to their strong demand for the 
product. These features allow us to observe how variance in relationship formation among sellers 
affects market prices in a way that would not be feasible if buyers could easily price-discriminate 
against minority growers. 
Champagne is a French wine region where, as in many other settings, women constitute a 
minority of the sellers. Like Simmel’s (1908/1955) “stranger”, they are part of the growers’ 
community yet are singled out within this community because of their gender. Representative of 
women’s feeling in this industry is the explanation of Charlotte1, one of our female interviewees: 
“Among grape growers, you lose a lot of credibility when you’re a woman [. . .] In the vineyard 
it’s harder to fit in as a woman, it’s a rough, rustic milieu. It’s a milieu, even if it’s Champagne 
so it sounds luxurious, where you’re essentially dealing with farmers.” Gender relationships are 
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salient among grape growers, and in this paper we examine how these relations can affect pricing 
behavior.  
For that purpose, our empirical approach is two-pronged: first, using detailed quantitative 
data, we demonstrate that there are gender-based differences in prices for Champagne grapes. 
The data involve contracts for 5,757 individual sales transactions between 58 Champagne houses 
and 429 grape growers over the period 1992–2009. These were obtained from a local agency that 
gave us confidential access to its entire database, and they were combined with an additional 
firm-level longitudinal data set assembled from three public sources: DIANE, the French 
National Registry of Trade and Companies, and the Guide Curien. Second, we use qualitative 
data to illustrate how relationships between female sellers help explain these price differences. 
We performed 67 interviews: 16 were conducted with industry experts, 14 with chief executive 
officers (CEOs) of Champagne houses, and 37 with grape growers (22 males and 15 females).  
In contrast to expectations from prior research on minorities and pricing, we find that—
compared with their male counterparts—female growers are able to charge systematically higher 
prices for their grapes. Our evidence indicates that, in response to their exclusion by male sellers, 
women develop informal relationships with other female sellers in search of social support. 
These relationships allow them to overcome local constraints on the availability of information 
while deviating from the market norms of individualism and pricing secrecy. Pulling together in 
this fashion helps women price more aggressively than male sellers and so enables them to 
extract higher prices from grape buyers. 
This paper contributes to the sociology of markets by documenting a novel theoretical 
pathway via which horizontal social relations between sellers can affect prices. Market 
exchanges are facilitated by social and cultural processes that provide actors with shared 
5 
 
normative understandings to guide their actions. We argue that intergroup relations create 
variance in these understandings and hence in the market behavior of minority versus majority 
sellers. Our findings highlight the consequences of these relations for price setting, which is at 
the heart of market functioning. This work’s second contribution is to the broader sociological 
literature on intergroup relations (Bonacich 1972; Olzak 1992), by identifying a new mechanism 
through which intergroup conflict can be contained while preserving the minority’s advantage. 
That literature has focused on occupational segregation, which reduces intergroup competition 
for resources, as the primary means of minimizing intergroup conflict (for an overview of this 
literature, see Olzak 2013). Our results suggest that, even in settings where the minority does 
gain access to an occupation previously reserved for the majority, social segregation may reduce 
the likelihood of conflict by making economic differences between the minority and majority 
groups less conspicuous. Finally, this study has implications for research on inequality in 
markets. In this area, scholars have been mostly concerned with documenting the economic costs 
associated with being a minority. A key question concerns the social processes that create and 
reproduce such inequalities. We identify a mechanism that enables the relationships nurtured by 
minority producers to mitigate some of the negative (economic, if not social) consequences of 
being excluded. In the discussion section, we elaborate on our theory’s boundary conditions as 
well as on the implications and generalizability of our findings. 
THEORY 
Price setting is key to market functioning, so it is of vital interest to economic sociologists 
exploring how social relations affect prices. This literature has focused mainly on interactions 
between buyers and sellers, and it has identified two broad categories of social mechanisms that 
affect price setting: governance mechanisms and signaling mechanisms (Podolny 2001). Work 
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that emphasizes governance mechanisms typically studies the role of social ties in providing 
valuable resources that may affect prices. For example, research on embeddedness has 
established that long-term exchange relations facilitate the transfer of private information while 
promoting trust between buyers and sellers (Uzzi 1999). These dynamics have been shown to 
affect the prices that sellers charge in a variety of contexts (Uzzi and Lancaster 2004; Bidwell 
and Fernandez-Mateo 2010; Elfenbein and Zenger 2013). In contrast, research that emphasizes 
the signaling value of relationships among sellers focuses on how producers’ ties to other market 
participants shape a buyer’s willingness to pay for the seller’s product (Podolny 2001). For 
instance, a seller’s ties to key market intermediaries—such as analysts and professional critics—
may enhance her legitimacy with potential buyers (Zuckerman 1999), which in turn allows her to 
charge higher prices to buyers (Roberts, Khaire, and Rider 2011). 
It is noteworthy that sociological research on the relational basis of prices has focused 
almost exclusively on vertical relations between buyers and sellers: thus relationships affect 
prices either indirectly, by influencing buyers’ perceptions of sellers’ relative quality, or by 
serving as a conduit for resource exchange between buyer and seller (Podolny 2001). Such 
research says little about social relations among sellers or among buyers—that is, about how 
horizontal relations may affect the price-setting process. However, we know that horizontal 
relations are formed by and operate via different processes than relations between buyers and 
sellers (Baker and Faulkner 1993). As a result, current theories about how vertical relations 
affect prices are not especially helpful as regards understanding the effects of horizontal 
relations. There is not much empirical evidence on this phenomenon, but the evidence we do 
have suggests that horizontal ties among producers shape price setting in unique ways. Ingram 
and Roberts (2000), for example, show that friendship ties between managers of competing 
7 
 
hotels affect the average price charged for available rooms. Friendship matters in that market 
because, among other reasons, it favors beneficial norms over aggressive competition and 
thereby allows producers to avoid price wars. In the Ingram and Roberts (2000) study, ties 
among producers vary as a function of the level of competition between them. Yet there may be 
other social factors that affect the likelihood of producers forming ties with one another. 
Drawing from research on intergroup relations (Blalock 1967; Bonacich 1972; Brewer 1991; 
Olzak 1992), we propose that intergroup processes on the sellers’ side of the market induce 
relationships between minority sellers, who respond to their isolation from the majority by 
seeking social support from other minority members. 
For the purposes of this study, we use Wirth’s (1945: 347) classic definition of minority 
as a “group of people who, because of their physical or cultural characteristics, are singled out 
from the others in the society in which they live for differential and unequal treatment, and who 
therefore regard themselves as objects of collective discrimination.” Many studies have offered 
evidence that minority sellers encounter unequal treatment in such markets as employment, 
housing, credit, or goods and services (Massey and Denton 1993; Ayres and Siegelman 1995; 
Pager and Shepherd 2008). In labor markets, minorities often receive lower prices for their 
work—that is, lower wages (for a review, see Grusky 2008). In the market for goods, research 
also shows that minority sellers often receive lower prices: audit studies provide examples of this 
phenomenon in classified ads (Doleac and Stein 2013), on eBay (Ayres et al. 2011), and in 
baseball card shows (List 2004). This work echoes the economic sociology literature on 
relationships and prices by focusing on vertical relations between buyers and sellers. If 
intergroup processes are at play in horizontal relationships (e.g., between majority and minority 
sellers), then it remains an open question just how these relations affect market prices. 
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In order to cope with their isolation, minority members tend to develop strong 
relationships with one another (Reagans 2005). One reason is that individuals strive to satisfy 
both a need for distinctiveness and a need for belonging (Brewer 1991). In such accounts, the 
theory of “optimal distinctiveness” suggests that too much separation from a group leads 
individuals seeking inclusion to join another collective (Leonardelly et al. 2010). In particular, 
when people are socially excluded or made to feel different from those in the majority group, 
they are likely to seek affiliation with fellow minority members2 (Brewer 1991). Such behavior 
helps reinforce their sense of connectedness to others while allowing differentiation from the 
majority that excludes them. This explains why members of low-status minorities may defy 
majority criteria for positive evaluation by embracing their distinctive group membership 
(Brewer 1991). These theoretical predictions are supported in experimental studies (Markus and 
Kunda 1986; Frable, Blackstone, and Scherbaum 1990) and are also in accord with the observed 
functioning of several minority groups, such as early Chinese immigrants to the United States 
(Nee and Nee 1973).  
Furthermore, relationships among minority members that are borne out of being excluded 
from the majority may yield tangible advantages—beyond satisfying their need for inclusion. 
Such possibility has been discussed by research on intergroup relations and reactive solidarity 
(Simmel 1908/1955; Coser 1956/1984; Bonacich and Modell 1980; Olzak and West 1991), with 
more recent work examining patterns of identification and solidarity across competing ethnic, 
gender and religious groups (e.g. Okamoto 2003; Gullickson 2010; Abascal 2015; Davenport 
2016). Work on ethnic resilience (Portes and Bach 1985) similarly alludes to social capital, 
broadly defined, as an explanation for the relative economic success of minority groups; 
examples include Chinese entrepreneurs in East Asia and Cubans in Miami (e.g., Sanders and 
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Nee 1987; Portes and Zhou 1992). In these studies, the minority advantage occurs through the 
colonization of a particular sector of employment in such a way that members have privileged 
access to new job openings while restricting the access of outsiders (Stepick 1989). While this 
behavior is consistent with that of a typical “middleman minority” (Zhou 2004), it leaves 
unresolved the question of how minorities might obtain favorable economic outcomes when they 
are not only minorities in a society but in a market sector as well.  
Although these studies do not examine price setting, they do imply that discrimination 
can be a double-edged sword: while it increases social exclusion from the majority, it encourages 
minority members to pull together and can create some economic advantages. In the context of 
market relationships, we expect that the need to belong to a collective stimulates the 
development of informal relations between minority sellers. This in turn allows them to 
overcome some common market frictions—for instance, constraints on the availability of 
information. When they get together, minority sellers can share useful market information from 
various sources and so can reap the benefits of multiple, nonlocal perspectives. Because these 
sellers interact and socialize, their trust in the accuracy of in-group information flows tends to be 
high. Furthermore, ongoing collaboration leads them to develop their own norms of behavior 
based on their unique understanding of market conditions. We also expect that the need to 
differentiate themselves from the majority affects how minority sellers behave in markets. 
Because they feel distinct from the majority and do not aspire to be assimilated (Levine 1977; 
Brewer 1991), they may well deviate from local norms of behavior. Like Simmel’s stranger, a 
minority seller is an “inner enemy”; “he is bound by no commitments which could prejudice his 
perception, understanding, and evaluation of the given [. . .] he is not tied down in his action by 
habit, piety, and precedent” (Simmel 1908/1955: 405). When local norms create frictions and so 
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constrain sellers’ sharing of information that could be consequential for price setting, the 
minority can derive unexpected economic benefits by deviating from those norms. 
As mentioned previously, there are severe challenges to testing this theoretical argument 
empirically. In order to isolate our seller-side mechanism, we require a setting in which buyer-
side factors can be “switched off”. Put differently, we need to minimize the effect of buyers’ 
actions—in particular, their potential discrimination against minority sellers—as an explanation 
for observed differences in the prices charged by minority versus majority sellers. It is 
reasonable to suppose that there is less discrimination against minority sellers in markets 
characterized by more competition among buyers (Becker 1971), and some empirical work does 
confirm that demand-side discrimination may not survive such buyer competition (Doleac and 
Stein 2013). Because the demand for Champagne grapes is relatively price inelastic owing to the 
limited supply and fierce competition among buyers, this market is an ideal empirical setting in 
which to observe the theoretical mechanism of interest. 
SETTING 
The Champagne Grape Market 
Champagne is a precisely defined area in France. Only sparkling wines made from grapes grown 
in that region can legally be called Champagne (Guy 2007). Champagne grapes are grown in 
vineyards by growers (the sellers) and are generally sold to Champagne houses (the buyers)—
such as Bollinger or Moët & Chandon—who use them to produce the sparkling wine. Grape 
quality is measured on an official scale established in the 1920s by a committee of growers and 
representatives of the houses; that scale is based on the crus (origin) of the grapes in question. 
Thus there is virtually nothing grape growers can do to improve the official quality of their 
grapes, since quality is tied to specific plots of land. While this feature is not crucial for our 
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theoretical argument, empirically, it allows us to be confident that buyers do not use a seller’s 
status (e.g. being a minority) to assess grape quality. All transactions take place at about the 
same time of the year: immediately following the harvest, which typically occurs between 
September and November. Most sellers sign declarations of intent to supply a given buyer for a 
number of years. Yet even when a seller signs a multiyear declaration, prices are renegotiated 
after each harvest. Furthermore, this is not an auction market: prices are negotiated one on one 
between buyers and sellers and there is no formal coordination between sellers; prices are not 
agreed upon by a central body. As these market characteristics suggest, there is little friction 
regarding information on the identity of buyers and sellers in general, or about the quality of the 
grapes being transacted. However, there are other significant information frictions: who does 
business with whom, to what extent, for what grapes, or at what price remains private 
information. As explained by Camille: “It’s still quite secretive [a market]. People don’t like to 
talk about business, especially their business […] Who they sell their grapes to or for how much 
is not the type of information people volunteer.”   
The market involves about 15,000 grape growers and 66 Champagne houses. Although 
there are many more grape sellers than grape buyers, the latter’s demand is relatively price 
inelastic. The law limits the amount of land that can be cultivated for wine production. As a 
consequence, grape buyers have extremely low self-supply ratios and depend on independent 
grape sellers for the vast majority of their supplies. In contrast, grape sellers are entitled to 
produce their own Champagne and so are not dependent on buyers for distribution: nearly a third 
of all grape sellers also produce Champagne. 
Although the grape supply is limited, demand for Champagne is booming. The domestic 
market remains strong, and international demand—especially from Russia and China—has risen 
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dramatically over the past two decades. Grapes have therefore become a scarce resource, which 
renders their demand virtually price inelastic. In what industry participants refer to as the “supply 
race”, grape buyers compete fiercely to secure access to supplies: “All that is required to sell 
unallocated Champagne grapes is a 30-second telephone call. They’ll be bought, unseen with 
gratitude and alacrity. They all need grapes desperately” (Jefford 2008). Given this high demand 
and limited supply, it is hardly surprising that the Champagne grape is now the most expensive 
grape in the world.  
It is worth noting that this advantageous position for grape growers did not emerge until 
after the Second World War; in fact, Champagne grapes sold for modest prices at the beginning 
of the twentieth century (Guy 2007). The relations then between buyers and sellers were 
antagonistic, with the houses “bullying” individual growers into giving them the lowest possible 
prices. Yet as the postwar demand for Champagne grew, growers began to organize into 
cooperatives (Guy 2007). These structures, which allowed them to store grapes over several 
harvests, increased the growers’ bargaining power – as they could now decline selling to houses 
when prices were deemed too low. Growers also successfully lobbied the French government to 
make it difficult for houses to buy up vineyards, thus securing exclusive access to an increasingly 
sought-after resource. Despite these bouts of collective action, because growers long struggled to 
make ends meet and therefore saw each other as competitors, the culture in Champagne grape–
growing communities has remained individualistic. Market conditions have changed drastically 
but the norms and culture have not followed suit. 
According to the CIVC, there were 15,567 grape growers in 2009 with an average of 2.18 
hectares each. These are very small businesses: in our sample, the average number of employees 
is just over three. These are also family businesses: the price of the land makes it a valuable 
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patrimonial asset that is nearly always passed from one generation to the next. The typical grape 
seller is a relative, by either blood or marriage, of the vineyard’s founder; according to Bruno, it 
is “very rare for a young person to be able to become a grower without inheriting the land from 
family members.” 
Female Grape Sellers as a Minority 
Like many occupations, grape growing is a male-dominated activity. In our sample, 14% of all 
grape sellers are women. A host of studies show that, over the last century, women have 
experienced various forms of social and economic discrimination across all French grape-
growing regions (for a review, see Escudier 2014). “At that time [in the 1970s], being a grower 
wasn’t a possible choice for a woman. My older brother would say ‘you’re going to have 
children, and that’s it.’ I was only supposed to be a wife or a mother” (Louise). Emma explains: 
“Men, especially in farming communities, seem to think that expertise can only come from or be 
used by men. Even today, you can sense that it’s easier to be a man, in this business. If you don’t 
fight, you’re left out. In this milieu, as a woman, you’re necessarily attached to some man, 
you’re the ‘wife of’, the ‘sister of’, the ‘daughter of’.” 
Gender is indeed a salient social category in this setting, where the grape growers’ 
population is very homogeneous in other dimensions such as ethnicity and socio-economic 
status.3 More importantly, because “people tend to consider grape growing and wine making to 
be a man’s job” (Camille), gender is also a key identity cue that distinguishes between a low-
status minority and the higher-status majority (Wirth 1945). Our interviews with female grape 
growers confirm that they acutely experience their minority status in the community. “We are in 
the minority as women in the business; we’re not always listened to as much as men, particularly 
in technical areas. In farming communities, tractors and chemical treatments are a man’s 
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domain” (Marie). Juliette adds: “We’re women. We don’t fit in the framework. We’re not your 
typical, rough farmer who works in the vineyards.” This feeling was echoed by several other 
women we interviewed, such as Alice: “Men have always had a monopoly; they work and live 
among one another. They have their technical conversations; there were no women involved. For 
years women […] couldn’t penetrate that milieu.” Juliette states that “I feel isolated [in the 
growers’ community] because we don’t speak” and Emma explains: “In a group of growers 
about my age, I’m 32, the men will only talk to other men. It’s inevitable.” Being female is thus 
a visible social category in Champagne, where women readily identify themselves as the 
minority group. We next examine the price consequences of this minority status.  
DATA 
As mentioned earlier, our mixed-methods approach relies on rich interview data to both better 
understand the context as well as subsequently shed light on our proposed theoretical 
mechanism. We conducted a first round of qualitative research to get a grip on the grape 
market’s general functioning—in particular with regard to the price-setting process and local 
industry norms. This involved 43 interviews during regular visits to Champagne between 2009 
and 2010: 16 with experts,4 13 with grape sellers (12 men and one woman), and 14 with grape 
buyers (CEOs of Champagne houses). We then conducted a second round of interviews (between 
March 2014 and December 2015) with 14 female and 10 male grape growers in order to assess 
how they perceived their respective positions in the grape-growing community and in the wider 
industry. Note that the qualitative data was intended neither as a systematic effort to build 
grounded theory nor to develop theoretical arguments. While our arguments are tested using 
quantitative data, the qualitative interviews help insure that the mechanism we describe does 
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indeed correspond to the experiences of both male and female grape growers (see Appendix 1 for 
further details).  
To first establish gender-based differences in pricing, we use proprietary quantitative data 
that consist of the contracts for 5,757 individual transactions in 815 dyads between 58 grape 
buyers (Champagne houses) and 429 grape sellers (grape growers) over the period 1992–2009. A 
transaction is the sale of a stipulated volume of grapes of a specified quality and price; in a given 
year, there could be several such transactions between the same buyer and seller. The set of 
contracts on which this study is based were obtained from a single agency that gave us 
confidential access to their entire database. Although such agencies call themselves “brokers”, 
their role is not to match buyers and sellers but rather to complete the extensive paperwork 
required by the CIVC to trace and control the origin of grapes exchanged. One of the authors 
spent a week at the agency in November 2009, during the harvest season, to gain an 
understanding of the nature of their work and their relationships with both buyers and sellers. All 
such agencies collect a standard fee, which is always paid by the buyer and amounts to a 2% 
commission on any transaction they record. We remark that, whereas the typical seller relies on a 
single agency, buyers often rely on many agencies. This means that our data capture the entire 
transaction network for grape sellers but not for grape buyers. 
We combined these transaction-level data with an additional data set on buyers and 
sellers assembled from the following public sources: (1) DIANE, a Bureau Van Dijk database 
containing detailed financial information on 974,000 French private and public companies; 
(2) the National Registry of Trade of Companies, the official government source of financial and 
legal information on French private and public companies; and (3) the Guide Curien de la 
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Champagne, a biennial publication created in 1991 by Champagne experts that provides detailed 
information about Champagne companies. 
Measures 
For the quantitative analyses, our unit of analysis is the transaction, but we devise measures at 
four separate levels: dyad, seller, buyer, and transaction. The data include the following 
variables, which are computed annually (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics). 
——Insert Table 1 about here—— 
Dependent Variable and Independent Variable 
Price. Our dependent variable is the final price (per kilogram) paid for grapes in each 
transaction observed over the study period. All prices are expressed in the equivalent of 1992 
French francs (FRF), and the average per-kilo price in our sample is FRF 23.73 (about €3.60). 
We decompose the final price into separate components, which are the base price (at which 
buyers and sellers start negotiating) and—in addition thereto—five categories of premiums that 
sellers may charge: (1) a loyalty premium reflecting past exchange relationships; (2) a duration 
premium for committing to longer contracts; (3) a premium that reflects the quality of work 
completed in the vineyard (e.g. quality of the pruning); (4) a need premium for delivering 
specific grape types (e.g., pinot noir vs. pinot meunier); and (5) an unspecified other premium. 
These premiums are not always added to the base price; some are relatively rare and most are of 
very small magnitude.5 
Female seller. Our independent variable is a binary indicator set to 1 if the grape-growing 
business is managed by a woman and set to 0 otherwise. The data for this variable come from the 
French registry described previously, which provides the name and gender of managers for all 
registered businesses. In our sample, 14% of all sellers are female and they account for some 
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15% of all transactions. The rest of our sample is composed of males (68% of all sellers) and 
mixed-gender teams (18% of all sellers). 
Control Variables: Dyad Level 
Relation duration. This count variable is equal to the cumulative number of years of the 
buyer–seller exchange relation at the time of the transaction. Since this variable is not linearly 
distributed, we use its natural logarithm (though all results hold when the variable is not logged). 
The average relation duration for a dyad is about three years. There is no significant difference in 
the duration of dyads involving male versus female sellers.  
Past volumes exchanged. This is the cumulative volume of grapes exchanged within a 
dyad (in thousands of kilos). We take its natural logarithm (though the results hold when the 
variable is not logged). The average cumulative volume exchanged for a dyad in our sample is 
145,000 kilos and there is no significant difference between dyads involving male versus female 
sellers. 
Control Variables: Seller Level 
Mixed-gender seller is an indicator variable set to 1 when the grape-growing business is 
managed by both a man and a woman (and set to 0 otherwise). Such businesses are usually 
managed by a couple or by a brother and sister. This variable is included in all regressions so that 
we can draw clean comparisons between male and female sellers. 
Seller incorporation is an indicator variable set to 1 if the seller is incorporated and 
otherwise to 0. Incorporation is a simple and affordable administrative procedure (costing 
between €650 and €800) that allows one to separate personal and business-related wealth; it 
makes a good proxy for the business savvy of sellers. In our sample, 76% of all sellers are 
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incorporated. Male sellers are significantly more likely than female sellers to be incorporated 
(73% vs. 58%, p < .000). Note that all buyers are incorporated. 
Seller winemaking is an indicator variable set to 1 if the grape grower describes 
winemaking as his or her primary activity. More than 12% of all sellers do so, and there is no 
significant gender difference in this regard. 
Seller unique ties counts the number of different buyers with which a seller transacts in a 
given year (regardless of how many transactions the seller makes with each buyer). The average 
number of ties for a seller in our sample is 1.40. On average, female sellers maintain more ties 
than do male sellers (1.56 vs. 1.38, p < .001). 
Seller size, or the volume (in thousands of kilos) of grapes sold annually by a seller. The 
average seller size in our sample is 44,000 kilos, and women tend to sell more than men (51,601 
vs. 42,613 on average, p < .006). We were unable to obtain reliable size data for five of the 
smaller sellers, so those observations are dropped from the analyses. 
Control Variables: Buyer Level 
Buyer unique ties is the number of sellers with which a buyer transacts in a given year 
(regardless of how many transactions it makes with each seller). In our sample, the average 
number of such ties is 5.2. Note that the population’s true mean is most likely larger, since 
buyers often use several agencies and we have no reliable data on buyers’ exchange relations 
outside our agency’s sample. 
Buyer size, or annual volume of purchases (in thousands of kilos; the average per buyer is 
3,016). To construct this variable, we use data from both the Guide Curien and DIANE; since 
buyers often use several agencies, a within-agency sample measure would underestimate the 
total annual volume purchased by a Champagne house. 
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Buyer profitability is the buyer’s annual return on assets (RoA). We include this variable 
because sellers may price-discriminate based on a buyer’s profitability. The average buyer’s 
RoA is 4.86%. We were unable to obtain reliable profitability data for six of the smaller buyers; 
hence these observations were dropped from our analyses. 
Control Variables: Transaction Level 
Grape quality. The quality of grapes exchanged is officially recorded on a scale, the 
echelle des crus, which ranges from 80 to 100. Based on the grapes’ origin, industry members 
distinguish between low-rated grapes—with no designated crus (rated between 80 and 90)—and 
high-rated grapes: Grands and Premiers crus (rated above 90). We create three binary variables: 
one for grapes rated between 80 and 90, one for grapes with crus between 90 and 95, and one for 
grapes with crus between 95 and 100.6 We remark that the same grower may sell grapes of 
different quality levels when the corresponding plots of land are located in different areas. There 
is no significant difference between men and women in the 90–95 category; however, female 
sellers are overrepresented in the 95–100 category and underrepresented in the 80–90 category. 
Our analyses do not incorporate the 197 transactions for which we have no data on quality. 
Transaction volume, or the volume exchanged (in thousands of kilos). An average 
transaction in our sample consists of 18,470 kilos of grapes. Women sell larger volumes of 
grapes on average than do males (20,415 vs. 17,778, p < .004). 
Share of annual volume is the volume of grapes that each transaction represents as a 
percentage of the total annual volume exchanged within the dyad. This variable is computed as 
Transaction volume divided by the Total annual volume exchanged within the dyad. 
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Other Variables 
We use Year dummy variables in all models to control for variations in harvests from one 
year to the next. Our robustness checks also control for the following variables: Grape type 
(chardonnay, pinot noir, or pinot meunier); Age of seller; Dependence of seller (volume of grapes 
sold within the dyad as a percentage of the seller’s total volume, by year); Dependence of buyer, 
defined analogously; Time since last transaction (number of years since the dyad’s previous 
completed transaction); Female buyer (gender of the Champagne house’s CEO); and Total 
annual volume (total annual volume of grapes exchanged within the dyad). Because data were 
missing for some of these variables (e.g., Grape type and Age of seller) and because some were 
strongly correlated with other controls, they are not included in the models presented next. 
However, our results change little when these additional controls are included. 
Estimation Strategy 
To analyze whether female grape growers charge different prices than male sellers, we use 
panel-data estimation methods. Prior work on pricing in the Champagne grape market has shown 
that the buyer’s identity plays an important role: buyers whose characteristics do not match 
sellers’ expectations, in terms of what a Champagne house “should look like”, are charged higher 
prices for the same grapes (Ody-Brasier and Vermeulen 2014). In order to control for these time-
invariant characteristics, we use buyer fixed effects. A Hausman test supports the use of a fixed-
effects specification. So that we can control adequately for relation duration while accounting for 
the left-censored nature of our data, we omit the first year of observations from our analyses.7 
Over the period that we examine, about 5% of the sellers (21 sellers, 470 observations) 
experience a change in their management. However, almost all of these consist of switches from 
one male manager to another—typically from father to son. In contrast, there are very few cases 
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of sellers for which we observe a switch from a male to a female manager (3 sellers, 27 
observations) or vice versa (no instances). We are thus not able to estimate within-seller effects 
because doing so would require that we disregard all time-invariant observations. 
Since we cannot use seller fixed effects, it is not possible to completely rule out the 
possibility of unobserved seller heterogeneity and the issues associated therewith. More 
specifically, there could be selection effects: given the male-dominated grape-growing 
environment, women who are more talented might choose to take over a family business whereas 
those who are less talented decide to exit (e.g., by selling the business, hiring a professional 
manager, or letting a male family member take charge). If the quality of the individual manager 
affected prices in some unobserved way and if higher-quality women self-selected into the field, 
then observed differences in prices between male and female sellers could be the result of that 
self-selection process. To alleviate this concern, we adopt two empirical strategies. First, we 
construct a control sample by pairing each female seller with an observationally equivalent male 
seller; second, we exploit an exogenous shock—namely, whether female sellers are widows. The 
former strategy is implemented via a coarsened exact matching procedure (CEM), which allows 
us to analyze male and female sellers who are similar to each other on the following dimensions: 
Seller incorporation, Seller unique ties, Seller size, Buyer unique ties, Buyer size, Grape quality, 
and Transaction volume.8 The final sample includes 2,338 observations: 1,851 controls and 487 
cases. For the latter strategy, we collect additional data that allow us to identify female sellers 
who are also widows. Because they took over the business after the death of their husband, these 
women are presumably less likely to have self-selected into grape growing.  
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ANALYSIS 
Main Results 
Results for our main analyses are summarized in Table 2.9 In all models, standard errors are 
robust and clustered by both buyer and seller.10 Model 1 is a pooled cross-sectional model; 
Model 2 is a panel regression with buyer fixed effects. Grape quality is a significant control 
variable across models; as expected, higher-quality grapes fetch higher prices. Being a female 
seller also yields significant results: compared with their male counterparts, females are able to 
charge FRF .43 more per kilogram in Model 1 (p < .000) and FRF .28 more per kilogram in 
Model 2 (p < .009). Recall that we are controlling for sellers managed by mixed-gender teams, 
which means that these coefficients compare sole male and female sellers. In separate analyses 
we confirmed that our results hold also if we remove this control variable and either compare 
female sellers with both male sellers and mixed-gender teams or compare female sellers with 
mixed-gender teams while controlling for male sellers. The size of the coefficients may seem 
small, but note that prices are pegged to the 1992 FRF and that the average grower sells about 
44,000 kilos of grapes each year. So for an average grape seller in 2009, these coefficients 
translate into an additional FRF 26,800 (OLS) or FRF 17,700 (FE) every year: about €4,085 or 
€2,698, respectively. During our interviews, male growers indicated that they would not view an 
additional €2,500 a year as trivial: “It’s not nothing. I’m a pretty small business. So yes, if my 
buyer gave me an additional 2,500 euros, of course I’d take it” (Charles). 
——Insert Table 2 about here—— 
We then run robustness checks for this main effect. First, to check that it is not driven by 
a few outliers, we remove observations in the 90th percentile of either the quality or quantity of 
grapes sold. Our results remain significant in both the OLS and FE specifications. Second, we 
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incorporate additional control variables into the regression; these include Grape type, 
Dependence of the seller, Dependence of the buyer, Time since last transaction, Female buyer, 
and Total annual volume. Although we lose a large number of observations owing to missing 
data (N = 3,048), our results remain (β = .49, p < .000 in the pooled OLS and β = .33, p < .002 in 
the FE specification – results available from the authors). As mentioned previously, we also use 
CEM to construct a control sample of observationally equivalent male sellers. On this matched 
sample we perform pooled OLS and also buyer FE regression analyses while including case 
control groups and clustering robust standard errors by both buyers and sellers. Despite the 
dramatic reduction in sample size, our results remain statistically significant at the 10% level 
(see Models 3 and 4 in Table 2). 
Additional Robustness Checks and Alternative Explanations 
Although the regressions using CEM help alleviate concerns that male and female sellers are 
fundamentally different, they cannot entirely rule out the possibility that women differ from their 
male peers in unobserved ways. We therefore conduct some further analyses to evaluate whether 
this is likely. First, as already mentioned, we use an exogenous shock (viz., whether female 
sellers are widows) to control for self-selection into grape growing. The rationale for this 
strategy involves using cases of women who (it can reasonably be presumed) did not explicitly 
choose to become sole managers of their grape-growing business. Using detailed data (from the 
French Registry of Trade of Commerce) on the family structure of management teams and 
individually examining each seller (through local press coverage and individual websites), we 
identify 29 widows in our sample (402 observations), two of whom were widowed during our 
sample period (36 observations). As expected, these women were older (54) on average than the 
average female grower (41). We ran analyses using the Widow variable, set to 1 for female 
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sellers who are widows (and to 0 otherwise); see Table 3. In both the pooled OLS model 
(Model 1) and the FE model (Model 2), as compared with men and other females, widows 
charge between FRF .43 (p < .030) and FRF .36 (p < .002) more per kilogram. In separate 
analyses we confirmed that our results remain significant (β = .56, p < .000) when we use seller 
fixed effects; this suggests that prices increase even for the two widows who assumed their late 
husbands’ responsibilities during our sample period. Again, these analyses do not obviate 
selection issues since some widows may decide to sell the business and exit our sample. The 
results are nonetheless reassuring because self-selection on unobserved quality will almost 
certainly be much lower among widows, yet these women also secure higher prices for their 
product. 
——Insert Table 3 about here—— 
As a second robustness check, we perform an event history analysis (EHA) to check 
whether there are gender differences in seller attrition rates in our sample. One might argue that 
men who are unsatisfied with the prices they receive may exit the sample at higher rates than do 
women and perhaps switch to a different agency (for which we would have no record). Our 
fieldwork suggests that agencies have no effect on grape prices; however, if this were not the 
case and if male sellers left the sample at higher rates, then that might explain why men seem to 
command lower prices than women in our sample. The Kaplan–Meier probability that females 
would remain in our sample does not differ significantly from that probability for male and 
mixed sellers (p < .10; see Figure 1). We obtain similar results both with proportional hazard rate 
models and with Cox regression models (available from the authors upon request). In short, our 
results indicate that the higher prices received by female grape sellers cannot be explained by 
different sample attrition rates of males versus females. 
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——Insert Figure 1 about here—— 
Third, it is possible that some grape-growing businesses are, for unobserved reasons, of 
higher quality or status and so allow their managers to extract higher prices. If women were to 
self-select into these businesses, then that could explain why they are able to charge higher 
prices. To address this possibility, we examine the size of individual fixed effects for each seller. 
Net of the influence of our independent and control variables, there is significant variance in the 
performance of individual sellers. In separate analyses we omit from our regressions the best 
performers—those above the 95th percentile and run the same analyses as in Table 2. The 
coefficient for Female remains significant (β = .31, p < .011 and β = .19, p < .034 in pooled OLS 
and FE regressions, respectively). This finding ameliorates the concern that our results are driven 
by a few high-performing businesses managed by women. 
Fourth, we explore whether the women in our sample differ from the men with regard to 
Grape quality; our results hold when we control for that quality. Even so, quality is a significant 
predictor of price in our regressions, and on average the women sell higher-quality grapes than 
do men (92.98 vs. 89.80, p < .000). One might worry that this pattern is consistent with a self-
selection account: “better” women choose to become growers only when they have access to the 
highest-quality plots. This explanation is unlikely for two reasons. First, recall that the official 
quality measure is exogenous; hence sellers cannot increase the quality of their grapes. Second, if 
this explanation were the true one then we would expect that it is the women with higher-quality 
grapes (i.e., the “better” women) who are able to extract higher prices. To check whether this is 
the case, we run seemingly unrelated regressions that compare women growing grapes of quality 
above and below the median. Results (available from the authors) show no statistical difference 
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between the two – i.e. the female price advantage does not apply only to women selling high 
quality grapes. 
Fifth, one might wonder about homophily; that is, perhaps female sellers charge higher 
prices to male buyers and lower prices to female buyers. Although we are using buyer fixed 
effects, in separate analyses we check for whether that distinction is being made by analyzing 
interaction effects between Female seller and Female buyer. The interaction does not have a 
significant effect on prices in the pooled cross section. In fact, our model with buyer fixed effects 
reveals that—when we control for buyers’ unobserved heterogeneity—female sellers charge 
higher prices when the Champagne house’s CEO is a woman (the coefficient for the interaction 
effect is β = .28, p < .021).11 However, one problem with this analysis is that grape sellers do not 
always deal directly with CEOs; our interviews indicate that sellers typically deal with the wine 
cellar “masters”. That position is nearly always held by a man: “in terms of the relationships with 
the houses [. . .] you’re only dealing with men. The decision makers in the big houses are all 
men” (Pauline). Over our entire period of observation, we identified only five female masters at 
any point. It follows that buyer-seller homophily is unlikely to play a significant role in 
explaining the pattern of results that we observe12.  
Once we have established the existence of a female price advantage in Champagne, we 
next provide qualitative and quantitative evidence concerning its underlying theoretical 
mechanism. 
Informal Relations between Female Sellers 
Previously we described how female sellers feel like a minority in Champagne. Studies across 
French wine regions show that women have long been barred from receiving any training in 
grape growing. As Charlotte confirmed, “There were generations in the 1980s where we 
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transmitted much less [knowledge] to women than to men. That’s still very true today.” Emma 
adds: “I had to tell my father: ‘It’s not because I’m a girl that I can’t understand something. If 
you explain something to me, I’ll understand it.’ But I had to repeat that over and over.” Women 
in Champagne often express frustration about not being taken seriously. Pauline explains: “The 
men assume I don’t know what I’m talking about and [that] I’m not professional [. . .] I’m never 
looked at as being the head of the business. I’m seen as the ‘wife of’ or the ‘daughter of’ so-and-
so. No one would assume that I could be the manager.” Laurence adds: “Being a woman and the 
milieu being somewhat misogynous, I’m not going to be taken seriously and when I started, they 
didn’t know me. In that milieu, it’s harder. A man who’s not known, he’s listened to right away 
[. . .] They’ll talk to me about cooking, when really, that’s completely silly.” The following 
anecdote is one of several that summarizes the impressions of many female sellers.  
Just last night, a friend who we know well, says: “oh, wow, you know how to 
prune [grapes]?” Well yeah! I’ve wanted to know how to do all that, from the 
beginning. In his head, and yet he’s a friend, it wasn’t possible. He was stuck in 
that idea [. . .] There’s still that attitude around anything tied to the land. The 
locals think that it’s men who work the land. That’s really old school. But still 
current [. . .] Now I feel I’ve found a job that suits me but also that I’ll never be 
recognized as a professional because of this barrier. (Claire) 
 
In this male-dominated environment, what might female sellers be doing differently to 
help them extract more value from exchange relationships with buyers? We argue that the 
underlying mechanism involves interactions among female sellers. Women face social isolation 
in the growers’ community, which leads them to come together informally and to develop 
relationships with other female growers. Those relationships provide unique opportunities to 
share relevant industry and private knowledge, helping women overcome local constraints on the 
availability of information. In particular, women ignore local norms of price secrecy by 
leveraging informal social support networks to gather price information, which they 
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subsequently use to raise the bar in price negotiations with buyers. In what follows we present a 
mix of qualitative and quantitative evidence to illustrate how this mechanism plays out. 
Our interviews suggest that female growers fit Simmel’s classic definition of “strangers” 
(1908/1955): even though they are a minority among grape growers, these women remain 
members of the community. Most have grown up in Champagne and have been raised in long-
established grape-growing families: “I come from a family of growers. My parents made 
Champagne, they were growers” (Pauline). Charlotte also recounts that “I was born in a vine-
growing family in Champagne [. . .] As a child, I went to school with grape growers [. . .] I went 
to the vineyards very early, I would go help my parents during summer vacations.” Despite being 
socially excluded by men, these women reportedly enjoy the “wanderer’s” freedom (Simmel 
1908/1955) to come and go as they please. “I’m not interested in being typical. I don’t have the 
same mentality or the same philosophy. I’m not like them [. . .] I have nothing in common with 
the growers in the village” (Juliette). Yet we observed how they suffer from a feeling of isolation 
due to their minority status. Because they are cast aside, women have a greater incentive to 
establish their own support network. Talking about her group of female friends, Alice confirms 
that “We’re quite tight in our little community.” During informal gatherings, they often share 
relevant market information and professional advice they do not receive from male growers. Our 
interviews suggest that female sellers are more involved than male sellers in informal 
professional groups: “I’m probably more involved than the average [grower], because I do stay 
informed” (Marie). Several whom we interviewed met with other female colleagues more or less 
regularly. “We try to do that, a couple of times a year and also try to stay in touch and share what 
each of us is doing. It’s informal, nothing official” (Camille). As explained by Clotilde, “[we get 
together] among friends [. . .] We share experiences.” Charlotte summarizes: “My position is a 
29 
 
bit isolated. If I have a support network, I’m the one who created it. It wasn’t there from the start. 
[. . .] today I know mostly women my age [. . .] Three of us are good friends, we have projects 
together; I help them on the estate.” Note that these informal networks are distinct from 
established industry groups, such as those set up by the growers’ union or the professional 
Champagne association.13 
These informal networks allow female sellers to build a collective understanding of 
market conditions that need not align with the majority sellers’ understanding. In particular, 
women gain a better understanding of buyers’ low price elasticity. As Charlotte explains, 
“growers don’t realize [. . .] that they have gold in their hands [. . .] There aren’t any problems as 
far as selling grapes. The demand is there. If we have grapes to sell, there are ten people 
knocking at the door to buy them, at least for now. We’re lucky [. . .] The person who wants to 
get the best price just needs to ask.” In contrast, Alain reflects: “what’s surprising is that the 
houses often raise the price without us asking, from year to year.” Based on their unique 
perspective on market conditions, women may adopt pricing behaviors that differ from those 
of men. Charlotte explains that “I know I don’t get the market price [. . .] What I can say is that 
I’m above market prices. But that’s also thanks to my personal network. There are many 
growers, I mean male growers, who think they shouldn’t talk about prices [. . .] [With three 
female colleagues] we discuss ahead of time. [. . .] With men, it’s really different: you have to 
keep quiet, not tell anything, do things on your own [. . .] It’s stupid.” As Blanche put it, “We’re 
less bothered with ‘no, in Champagne, this is not the way things are done. You don’t just ask 
your neighbor how much he’s getting.’ We just go for it so we can make better decisions.” 
This attitude contrasts sharply with what seems to be the norm prevailing among male 
grape sellers—namely, to keep price information fairly secret. Claire comments: “On a day-to-
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day basis, growers tend to be independent. They work on their own, not needing anyone. They 
are also proud of saying they are doing things on their own, without any help.” Benjamin 
confirms that characterization as follows.  
No, these [prices] are not things we discuss [. . .] We don’t talk about this much. 
Anyway, who knows if people are being honest about what they say. Personally, I 
don’t talk about money. I don’t try to see how much this one or this one got. 
Because some will always be able to get a little more: “I got X euros”; “Oh yeah, 
well I got X more,” etc. [. . .] I’m not in that spirit, I’m not in the business of 
selling carpets. I think it’s not right. 
 
Antoine adds: “Well, there’s a general market price. No one talks about it, but everyone has a 
good sense of what it is [. . .] For now, I don’t think there’s a huge difference between the 
highest and the lowest price [paid for grapes]. I don’t want to know what the percentage is. I 
don’t want to know; it’s not that important.” Lucas concludes: “Price is not something people 
talk about in Champagne. It’s a private matter. For some reason, it makes people feel 
uncomfortable. I think it’s a bit distasteful anyway. I don’t need to know how much my neighbor 
makes and my neighbor certainly does not need to know how much I make.” Note that this 
attitude is very much in line with Lamont’s account (1992) of French people’s relation to money. 
“The French in general are clearly less money-oriented than Americans” (Lamont, 1992: 65). 
This is because money is perceived as impure and talking about money is embarrassing. Money 
also symbolizes an uncomfortable and profane relationship with customers and institutions. 
Consequently, “it’s not acceptable to talk about prices and purchases” (Lamont, 1992: 67).  
Relatedly, our interviews with male grape growers reveal that they are largely unaware of 
the benefits accruing to female sellers. Men do not know that their female counterparts charge 
higher prices than they do. Martin puts it this way: “I don’t think there are any differences in 
price [. . .] I don’t see any reason why men and women would obtain systematically different 
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prices [for their grapes]. I really don’t.” Pierre adds: “What could possibly explain differences 
[between male and female grape sellers]? Honestly, I think it comes down to individual 
characteristics: some men are good, some men are bad, some women are good, some women are 
bad. It’s not about gender.” Richard concludes: “I would be very surprised to find out women are 
getting higher prices. I mean, good for them if that’s the case. But I’d be surprised.” 
Furthermore, because female grape growers maintain close and amicable relations with 
female colleagues, their faith in the information exchanged is high. This level of trust is rare in 
the growing community. Vincent explains that “this [other] grower was saying: ‘this house pays 
me that much.’ Then he went on to say ‘I’ll ask for more next year.’ He was really bragging. But 
did he really get that price? [. . .] I don’t know.” Victor confirms: “Nowadays, no one tells the 
truth. It’s a big problem. You just can’t figure out what the true market price is.” Benjamin adds: 
“Is this information true? It must be if they say so! [laughs] But you know, I’d rather get some 
more serious information—from our union. I remain pretty cautious when someone gives me 
information. I would not act on it until I’ve received confirmation.” Thierry concludes: “to get 
useful information, I read Champagne Viticole [the growers’ trade publication]. And I go to our 
[union’s] meetings. I think that’s what most of my colleagues do to keep up-to-date.” This 
approach is quite different from the one described by Blanche: 
A woman will work on it, inform herself, call her friends for advice on price. 
With [a female friend], when I renegotiated my grape contracts, I called her. I 
called other friends. I asked them: “How much do you ask per kilo? I want to be 
coherent in my pricing strategy.” I go and ask. I think women are more willing to 
ask. As women, we’re more willing to get help, and less proud about asking our 
neighbors for advice [. . .] It’s all about information [. . .] [what matters is] 
knowing what others are doing in terms of price, I mean working the network 
[. . .] Knowing who works with whom, what price they were able to get, what the 
offers are. 
 
——Insert Table 4 about here—— 
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Access to private information via these informal relations may help explain differences in 
the pricing behavior of men and women. More specifically, it could allow female sellers to price 
their grapes more aggressively. Given our detailed data on the final price obtained by sellers, we 
were able to examine whether women receive a higher base price or if instead they are 
negotiating higher premiums. Recall that the final price consists of the base price (at which 
buyers and sellers start negotiating) and premiums of various types. Although female sellers do 
not receive significantly different premiums, they extract a higher base price (see Table 4). In 
Models 1 and 2, female sellers start price negotiations at a level that is from FRF .46 to FRF .29 
higher than do their male peers. This finding is consistent with how female growers describe the 
price negotiation process in interviews. Overall, they describe a short and uncomplicated process 
in which they lead the discussion:  
I have some specific demands. For example, I will commit that many hectares, 
that many kilos of grapes. I would like to get those at such a price, so I set the bar, 
typically it’s the best price. Once I’ve given my requirements, then I want to best 
price [. . .] Negotiations are very, very easy. We’re in a position of strength so 
super easy. I mean, I don’t know, maybe my experience is somewhat unique, but 
honestly men don’t negotiate too much with me. I don’t know if it’s easy for 
them, but for me it’s certainly easy. (Alexandra) 
 
——Insert Table 5 about here—— 
 
If female sellers share information that allows them to set a higher asking price than male 
sellers, as our interviews suggest, then one would expect the variance in price to be lower for 
women. To see whether or not this is the case, we use a multiplicative heteroscedasticity (or 
variance decomposition) model (see Table 5). This model enables simultaneous estimates, via 
maximum likelihood methods, of how gender affects the mean and variance of price (Greene 
1997; Weesie 1998; Sorenson and Sørensen 2001). As would be expected if the higher prices are 
achieved through information sharing within the community of female growers, we find that 
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female sellers command a higher price than do male sellers (β = .50, p < .000). It is noteworthy 
that we also find—in line with our theorizing—that the variance in the residuals is lower when 
the seller is a female (β = −.12, p < .025). It is possible that the standard errors for the variance of 
the residuals are affected by the smaller size of the female-only sample. To check for whether 
this is an issue, we ran the same analyses using a random but same-sized subsample of male 
growers. Our results continue to hold. 
——Insert Table 6 about here—— 
If, as our qualitative evidence suggests, women get together to share market information 
and professional advice to a greater extent than men do, we would expect that the likelihood of 
such informal meetings is increasing in geographical proximity. If so, then the spatial 
autocorrelation in price should be greater for female than for male sellers. Because we have 
precise location data for sellers, we are able to examine the general price-clustering tendencies. 
First we compute Moran’s I, a global index of spatial autocorrelation that expresses the degree of 
similarity in prices charged by proximate sellers (see Table 6). Using the prices charged by each 
seller in 2009—which is the year for which we have the greatest number of observations—we 
find significant spatial clustering for both female sellers (I = .16, p < .014) and male sellers (I = 
.21, p < .000). An important limitation of Moran’s I is that it cannot control for grape quality, 
which is clearly correlated with location. In order to examine spatial clustering in price while 
controlling for quality, we compute spatial autoregressive models “with disturbance” (a.k.a. 
SARAR models) using the price charged by each seller in 2009.14 For female sellers, we find that 
prices do reflect SAR dependence (λ = .83, p < .041); this result indicates that the grape prices of 
female sellers are affected by those of neighboring (female) sellers. However, we find no such 
34 
 
SAR dependence in the prices obtained by male sellers (λ = .31, p < .219). These findings give 
us further confidence in the validity of our proposed mechanism. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Prices are crucial in markets; they facilitate resource allocation and constitute a critical means by 
which market participants appropriate rents (Uzzi and Lancaster 2004). In this paper we 
document a novel theoretical mechanism—intergroup processes—through which horizontal 
relationships between sellers shape the prices paid by buyers. We illustrate this mechanism using 
proprietary transaction-level data in the market for Champagne grapes. Female grape growers 
(who are a minority of the sellers) obtain higher prices for grapes of the same quality sold by 
male growers. We posit that women in this setting react to their social isolation from the majority 
by seeking support from each other, leveraging these informal relationships to gather pricing 
information. Our qualitative evidence, combined with supplemental statistical analyses, suggests 
that women tend to disregard the local norms of individualism and secrecy that typify male grape 
growers. In so doing, they overcome market information frictions and take advantage of buyers’ 
relatively price inelastic demand, which allows them to charge higher prices. 
The unique features of our quantitative data allow us to rule out a number of alternative 
explanations for these findings—e.g., heterogeneity between male and female sellers or 
businesses, female self-selection, and gender-related sample attrition rates. Nonetheless, we 
recognize that the quantitative results could be interpreted as being partly driven by women 
deliberately ignoring norms against price collusion. We believe that our fieldwork helps assuage 
this concern, since it indicates that women’s cordial relations are not simply a vehicle for 
anticompetitive behavior. That is, it appears that female growers pull together not with the 
purpose of colluding but rather to compensate for their social exclusion from the majority. These 
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informal relationships facilitate the benevolent and legitimate exchange of professional 
information, including market prices (for a similar argument, see Ingram and Roberts 2000). 
Nevertheless, it is ultimately not possible to rule out that collusion motivates female grape 
growers to develop informal relations. This motivation would not invalidate our overall 
theoretical argument, but it would make its interpretation and implications more nuanced. The 
literatures in economics (e.g., Scherer 1980) and sociology (e.g., Baker and Faulkner 1993, 
Podolny and Scott-Morton 1999) underscore the controversial nature of price collusion, which 
creates inefficiencies and reduces social welfare by artificially raising prices. It is worth 
remarking that cartels are generally formed by high-status incumbents (Podolny and Scott-
Morton 1999). Yet our results instead reflect a situation whereby low-status newcomers start 
from a disadvantaged structural position but then improve their economic outcomes through 
cooperation. This raises interesting questions about the sources and consequences of price 
collusion—including consumer welfare—as a function of the status of the groups involved in 
such practices. 
This paper makes three contributions to the literature. First, it contributes to research on 
how social relationships shape prices by studying horizontal rather than vertical market 
interactions. With few exceptions (see Baker and Faulkner 1993; Ingram and Roberts 2000), 
horizontal ties have received little attention by sociological research on price-setting processes. 
Our study makes advances here by identifying a mechanism that shapes the likelihood and 
consequences of sellers forming relations with each other. In accord with prior work on 
intergroup relations (Simmel 1908/1955; Bonacich and Modell 1980; Olzak and West 1991; 
Brewer 1991), we find that minority sellers feel excluded from the majority and develop 
relationships to achieve a sense of belonging. Thus group processes help explain the variance in 
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producers’ propensity to form horizontal market relations. This finding matters because who 
forms relationships with whom is an important aspect of price setting (Ingram and Roberts 
2000). Our research extends this line of inquiry by showing how these relationships enable 
minority producers to deviate from some of the majority’s rules of market behavior, especially 
norms—here, about information sharing—that may be consequential for the price-setting 
process. Future research may examine how other types of group processes leading to horizontal 
market ties (on either the seller’s or the buyer’s side) could similarly affect prices by shaping 
behavioral norms and/or patterns of information transmission among market actors. 
Second, our study contributes to the sociological literature on intergroup relations (e.g., 
Bonacich 1972; Olzak 1992; Okamoto 2003; Gullickson 2010) by documenting a previously 
unexamined mechanism that may prevent conflict between majority and minority groups. 
Previous research has identified horizontal competition between minority and majority producers 
as a key driver of intergroup conflict, as in markets where producers must compete for finite 
resources (e.g., jobs; see Bonacich 1972 and Olzak 1992). Our research suggests that, even when 
minority and majority producers compete for the same resources, social segregation may reduce 
the likelihood of one group noticing the other’s economic outcomes. In Champagne we observed 
that majority sellers are largely unaware of the benefits accruing to minority sellers: men do not 
know that their female counterparts charge higher prices. In this setting, social segregation seems 
to inhibit comparisons by limiting contact between groups. Our findings thus suggest that 
intergroup conflict may be averted when social segregation makes it difficult for market actors to 
know they are “leaving money on the table” (see also Fernandez-Mateo 2007). 
Finally, our findings have implications for research on market inequality. A stream of 
work in this area argues that inequality arises from status-based processes of exclusion that 
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govern the distribution of opportunities (see e.g. Tomaskovic-Devey 1993). Thus high-status 
groups attempt to preserve their advantage by limiting the access (to resources) of lower-status 
groups (Tilly 1998); the latter may respond by challenging the majority’s advantages or by 
drawing on other resources (Stainback, Tomaskovic-Devey, and Skaggs 2010). Women in 
Champagne are not granted high status, and they report feeling underestimated by their male 
peers. Yet their reaction is not to challenge the majority’s dominant status but instead to draw on 
other social resources and to exercise market power in a way that the majority does not. So 
contrary to most prior research, we establish that market status and pricing advantages can be 
decoupled. Of course, it is important to recognize that the female pricing advantage may hardly 
compensate for the continuing lack of non-material disadvantages, such as a lack of respect, 
recognition or inclusion, that women experience in this setting. Nonetheless, our finding is 
significant because, in most social settings, women have less power and status than men. 
Scholars often cite women’s network structures to explain their low (relative to men) positional 
power and authority (Ibarra 1992, 1993; Burt 1998; Lutter 2015). This line of reasoning argues 
that gender-homophilous networks limit women’s access to high-status actors and that network 
cohesiveness prevents women from accessing relevant and nonredundant information. There are 
also consistent findings that women are less likely to ask for higher pay (Babcock and Laschever 
2007)—and are more likely to be penalized if they do so (Bowles, Babcock, and Lai 2007). Our 
research emphasizes the need to identify and examine conditions under which women (and other 
groups encountering discrimination in one domain) can benefit from their network cohesiveness 
and exercise market power by other means without suffering a backlash.  
Because the supply of Champagne grapes is constrained and demand is relatively price 
inelastic, buyers do not discriminate among sellers in our setting. This unusual context is 
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therefore most attractive because it allows us to isolate the effect of horizontal relations between 
minority producers on market prices. At the same time, the uniqueness of the setting requires that 
we sketch some boundary conditions of our theoretical argument. That is: Under what 
circumstances are minority groups likely to engage in the types of information exchange–based 
networking behaviors that might yield a market advantage?  
First of all, our theory applies when minority members pull together for social support in 
the face of perceived discrimination—rather than distancing themselves from the minority and/or 
seeking assimilation within the majority group. The basis of minority status here is gender, but 
elsewhere the defining characteristic could be nationality, ethnicity or any other salient social 
category (Reagans 2005; Mehra et al. 1998). What matters is that individuals identify as 
members of the minority group. It is this identification process – and not the nature of the 
minority status per se - that constitutes the basis of increased social cohesiveness in the face of 
exclusion (Reagans 2005; Brewer 1991). Prior research suggests that individuals’ identification 
with a minority group is shaped both by group size as well as by the clarity of the boundary 
between the minority and the majority (Leonardelly et al. 2010; Olzak 1992). First, the size of 
the group shapes the extent to which minority actors collaborate rather than compete with one 
another. For instance, Ely (1994) finds that women are more likely to develop supportive 
relationships with other women at work when they constitute a substantial minority rather than a 
handful of “tokens” (Kanter 1977). Thus we should expect minority members to pull together for 
social support in settings where they form a minority small enough to induce identification with 
their in-group but not so small that they feel compelled to distinguish themselves by competing 
with each other. Second, group solidarity in the face of intergroup conflict is more likely to arise 
when there is a clear boundary between the minority and the majority (see also Olzak, 1992). 
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This is in turn more likely to happen for homogeneous rather than heterogeneous groups 
(Leonardelly et al. 2010). As mentioned above, the status of women as a clearly defined minority 
group is uncontroversial in the Champagne market. It is however plausible that both intergroup 
conflict and minority cohesiveness are more diffuse where intersecting minority statuses are 
present – e.g. where gender and ethnicity are alternative basis of group identification.15 How the 
social dynamics we have identified operate in such cases is an intriguing question for future 
research.    
A second boundary condition for our findings—to which we have alluded repeatedly—is 
that buyers be unlikely to price-discriminate because of their relatively inelastic demand. This 
condition stems from specific market features: in the Champagne grape market, as in various 
other settings (e.g., pharmaceuticals, some education, luxury products), supply is constrained and 
perfect substitutes are not readily available. Nonetheless, our theoretical arguments may still 
operate in markets where buyers are able to price discriminate – we simply would not be able to 
observe their price effects in as clean a manner as we now do. It is indeed plausible that in those 
markets minority sellers form horizontal relationships, share private information and obtain a 
better price than they would otherwise (but not necessarily a better price than the majority 
group). The unique characteristics of our setting thus allow for cleaner identification of our 
mechanism’s effects on pricing, but they do not necessarily cause its operation. A context worth 
exploring on this regard is that found in some sectors of the labor market, where minorities may 
overcome some market frictions by developing horizontal relationships. Whether they obtain 
price benefits from doing so—such as higher wages than they would obtain otherwise—is an 
open empirical question that suggests fruitful directions for future research.   
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Relatedly, for our theory to operate there must be a certain amount of information friction 
in the market.  If information about key determinants of price setting flowed seamlessly among 
producers regardless of the pattern of relationships among them, then the minority group’s ability 
to extract price benefits from their informal ties would indeed be limited. Yet market frictions in 
the presence of imperfect information are ubiquitous (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976; Phlips 1988); 
they may result from local norms of behavior (as in the Champagne grape market) or from other 
institutional features. For instance, the markets for labor, credit, and housing all feature 
information frictions, such as significant search costs for both buyers and sellers (Stigler 1962). 
However, more important for our theory than the existence of market frictions is the ability of 
minority sellers to extract better prices by overcoming these frictions without eliciting a reaction 
from other market participants. In order for this condition to hold, it is important that the 
minority group be of small size—a key factor also in the likelihood of group members getting 
together in the first place. This condition reflects the crucial requirement that minority group 
behavior be neither widely noticed nor acted upon by the other players, which in our setting are 
the buyers and the majority of sellers. The former are unlikely to react to small price differences 
given their low price elasticity; members of the latter, as already described, are not even aware of 
any price differences. Hence we expect that minorities can avoid backlash in settings where 
deviations from the norm are not public knowledge. This would be consistent with research in 
institutional theory confirming the intuitive notion that the opacity or lack of visibility of 
controversial practices reduces negative reactions from third parties (e.g. Briscoe and Murphy 
2012; Phillips, Turco and Zuckerman 2013).  
Lastly, it is possible that our broader theoretical argument about intergroup processes in 
the formation of horizontal ties could have consequences on market outcomes other than prices. 
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That is, if minority sellers form tighter relationships in response to their isolation from the 
majority and overcome market frictions in doing so, they could potentially get access to valuable 
resources in a way that the majority may not do. In such circumstances minority sellers may be 
unable to extract higher prices from their stronger informal networks but might still translate the 
benefits from those ties into other types of market advantages, such as access to preferential 
resources. Given our focus on price setting processes, we have not theorized about this 
possibility; however, it is certainly an intriguing question for future research. 
Hence more research is needed if we are to understand when the specific pricing 
mechanism that we describe in the case of Champagne can be generalized to other contexts and 
perhaps contribute to mitigating negative economic consequences for minority groups. 
Nevertheless, we conclude by stressing that, as our case illustrates, if the likelihood of backlash 
is small, then minority mobilization can actually trump discrimination. So when given the 
chance, minorities —like the women in Champagne—do ask for more and are likely to receive 
more. 
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1 All growers were given pseudonyms.  
2 Note that, in this view, what constitutes a “minority group” is context specific; individuals belong to multiple 
social categories (e.g. race, gender or socio-economic class) and could identify with one or several of those 
characteristics depending on the social context (Reagans 2005; Mehra et al. 1998).  Of particular interest are 
cases where individuals choose to identify with a low-status category as a reaction to being excluded by the 
majority on the basis of that specific dimension (see Leonardelly et al. (2010) for a review of this literature). 
This focus on the majority’s behavior towards minority members is also a key feature of Wirth’s (1945) classic 
definition of “minority,” as well as of sociological research that emphasizes competition for resources as a 
driver of ethnic boundary formation and intergroup conflict (Olzak, 1992; Okamoto, 2003). Thus 
minority/majority relationships reflect the presence of unequal treatment, either actual or perceived, of one 
group by another (rather than simple numerical representation). 
3 The French Institute of National Statistics does not collect data on ethnicity, so reliable information in this 
regard is not available. Anecdotally, during our fieldwork and interviews over multiple trips, we did not meet a 
single visible ethnic minority in the Champagne vineyards.    
4 Experts include the presidents of the three local trade associations (SGV, UMC, and CIVC), a Masters of 
Wine (MW), a scholar from the Champagne Management Chair at Reims Business School, a UBS analyst of 
European luxury goods, the managing director of the UK Champagne Bureau, Champagne agents, and a 
former head of the UMC. 
5 Loyalty premiums are 3.02% of the final price and are added to 48% of all transactions, duration premiums 
are 1.32% and affect 40% of transactions, quality premiums are .28% and apply to 5% of the transactions, need 
premiums are 1.71% and affect 48% of transactions, and other premiums are .36% and apply to 10% of all 
transactions. 
6 In our analyses, the highest-quality grade is the omitted category. Our results are not affected if we use a 
continuous quality measure ranging from 80 to 100 or use alternative cut-off points for the binary variables. 
7 The data are left-censored because we do not start observing buyer–seller dyads until 1992. One year is by far 
the most frequent duration for “breaks” in dyadic relationships. We therefore drop our first year of 
observations so as to mitigate potential left-censoring issues. That being said, results are unchanged when data 
for 1992 are included. 
8 This approach matches with respect to characteristics for which male and female sellers are significantly 
different. However, our results hold also under alternative matching criteria. 
9 The R-squared values reported for our regressions are rather high because our year dummies, each of which 
corresponds to a particular harvest, explain much of the variance in price (over 50% in the pooled OLS and 
panel regressions). This outcome is not surprising given the agricultural nature of the product we are 
examining. 
10 We use an implementation developed by Kleinbaum, Stuart, and Tushman (2013) of the Cameron, Gelbach, 
and Miller (2011) method of multiway clustering. 
11 This effect is difficult to interpret because it is driven by only a few observations. 
12 One may worry that women obtain higher prices because of “feminine charm” (Jones 1964). Recent work 
suggests that using feminine charm in buyer–seller negotiations does not enable female sellers to extract higher 
prices than their male counterparts (e.g. Kray, Locke and Van Zant 2012). Our interviews did not indicate 
either that female growers generally perceive feminine charm as a negotiation advantage. It is thus not clear 
how this could play a meaningful role. Relatedly, one may wonder whether women get higher prices simply 
because it is culturally inappropriate to argue aggressively with women in France. Research in cross-cultural 
negotiation suggests this is unlikely. “The French don’t make any difference between men and women. The 
person across the table is judged for what he or she represents and not on whether they are a man or a woman.” 
(Van Der Valt, 2010: 2). The openly conflictual dynamics we observed between male and female sellers also 
lead us to believe that women are unlikely to receive a more favorable treatment when negotiating with men. 
Overall, then, we have no good reason to believe that these demand-side factors are a viable alternative 
explanation for our results. 
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13 In fact, the women we interviewed often expressed some skepticism—if not outright suspicion—toward 
official growers’ groups. The association’s “female grape grower” subdivision is “looked upon [by men and 
women] as a bit of a joke” (Louise). 
14 Estimates are consistent for most years and are available from the authors upon request. 
15 This is so for two reasons. First, intersectionality theory suggests that the complexity associated with 
multiple social identities (e.g. race and gender) makes individuals’ choice of a basis for identification less 
straightforward (see Shields 2008). Second, where intersecting minority statuses are present, the salience of the 
boundary between the minority and the majority group is fuzzier. This may weaken both intergroup conflict 
and its ensuing reactive solidarity (see Olzak, 1993). 
